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Abstract Ethical evaluation of deep brain stimulation
as a treatment for Parkinson’s disease is complicated
by results that can be described as involving changes
in the patient’s identity. The risk of becoming another
person following surgery is alarming for patients,
caregivers and clinicians alike. It is one of the most
urgent conceptual and ethical problems facing deep
brain stimulation in Parkinson’s disease at this time. In
our paper we take issue with this problem on two
accounts. First, we elucidate what is meant by “beco
ming another person” from a conceptual point of view.
After critically discussing two broad approaches we
concentrate on the notion of “individual identity” which
centers on the idea of “core attitudes”. Subsequently we
discuss several approaches to determine what
distinguishes core attitudes from those that are more
peripheral. We argue for a “foundational-function
model” highlighting the importance of specific depen-
dency relations between these attitudes. Our second aim
is to comment on the possibility to empirically measure
changes in individual identity and argue that many of
the instruments now commonly used in selecting and
monitoring DBS-patients are inappropriate for this
purpose. Future research in this area is advised
combining a conceptual and an empirical approach as
a basis of sound ethical appraisal.
Keywords Neuroethics . Deep brain stimulation .
Personal identity . Parkinson’s disease . Personality
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Introduction
Deep brain stimulation (DBS) has proven to be an
effective therapeutic option in movement disorders such
as Parkinson’s disease (PD) [1]. Recently, it also has
had a renaissance in psychiatric diseases: published
data indicate that DBS can be applied successfully to
significantly alleviate symptoms of several psychiatric
disorders ([2, 3]). In spite of this good news the ethical
legitimacy of DBS has been questioned in both public
and academic settings ([4, 5]). Skeptics in both circles
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think that DBS is not as unproblematic as is sometimes
supposed. They argue that its drawbacks are generally
misconceived or at least underestimated. In this
endeavor, they emphasize certain psychological
changes in the patient.
Currently, the most commonly performed DBS
surgery is the stimulation of the subthalamic nucleus
(STN) to alleviate motor symptoms of Parkinson’s
disease. Therefore we will position the majority of our
arguments on information and experience developed
in the treatment of patients with this illness. Stimu-
lation of the STN in PD patients has undoubtedly
beneficial effects on motor symptoms and patients’
quality of life [1]. Neuropsychiatric changes have at
first glance not been very pronounced, and were not
described in the first reports [6]. More recent large
controlled trials investigating neuropsychiatric and
neuropsychological changes in PD patients with DBS
report small changes in executive functions like verbal
fluency and an improvement in anxiety measures [7].
These results contrast with the experience and with
more sporadic case reports of stimulation induced
acute depression [8], hypomania and mirthful laughter
([9, 10]) as well as pathological crying [11]. There are
also reports of patients suffering significant problems
in social adjustment including marital problems and
problems in professional life ([12, 13]). Consequently,
there is a contrast between almost minimal neuropsy-
chiatric changes reported by large trials using stan-
dardized tests and case reports as well as clinical
experiences of sometimes more poorly defined and
perhaps more difficultly quantified changes experi-
enced by PD patients following the procedure.
Taking into account the tight anatomical and
functional interconnection of limbic “emotional”
loops, cognitive-associative loops and motor loops
[14] in the basal ganglia, we speculate that the
stimulation of these areas, including the STN can
cause discrete changes in a wide spectrum of
functions and may in fact account for some of those
more sporadic reports mentioned above [15]. Changes
of this type have already started to appear in the
literature with investigators finding changes in PD
patients’ decision making abilities in response to
medications [16] and DBS [17]. These reports
highlight the complexity of PD patients’ lives and
the fact that the amelioration of motor symptoms may
be just one aspect of their daily struggle. Taken
together, today we can clearly show the highly
beneficial effects of DBS on PD motor symptoms,
but have to consider the existence of discrete, but
possibly highly relevant changes in the stimulation-
induced neuropsychiatric profile and social adaptation
of PD patients following DBS.
Changes reported by these sporadic and sometimes
nonspecific reports have led to some interesting skep-
tical arguments regarding DBS. These arguments focus
on what philosophers call “the identity of persons” or,
briefly, “personal identity”. For example, there are
anecdotal reports in the medical literature as well as in
patients’ internet chatrooms that you get ‘another
person’ with stimulation. The question of whether there
is such a change—of whether the patient under
stimulation is not the same person as the patient without
stimulation—obviously depends on the underlying
concept of “personal identity”. As most contributors to
the above mentioned discussions feel that ‘getting
another person’ is potentially problematic, their reports
suggest a possible link between the conceptual question
of what is meant by “personal identity” and the ethical
challenge of weighing probably conflicting goods in the
ethical evaluation of DBS.
Similar arguments as in internet chatrooms and in
anecdotal reports occur in ethical discussions. In her
recent article “Neuroethics for a new millennium”
Adina Roskies asks:
“Some current interventions (…) will be such
as to perhaps improve the health and func-
tioning of the patient, but perhaps at the
expense of altering the brain chemically or
mechanically. Will certain (…) therapies
change who we are? (…) Will we have to
weigh the costs of biological death against
continued life but destruction of ourselves?”
([18], 22, our emphasis)
Not quite as dramatic as Roskies but similar in
purpose, Walter Glannon states with regard to a patient
with advanced PD, whose motor symptoms were well
controlled under stimulation but who developed symp-
toms including mania and chaotic behavior and there-
fore had to be kept in a closed ward:
“[I]n deciding whether to continue stimulating
the brain for advanced PD [Parkinson’s disease]
(…) [t]he tradeoff is between acceptable quality
of life regarding motor control and alteration of
the mind.” ([19], 291, our emphasis)
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The italicized passages in these quotations reveal a
shared presupposition: both authors maintain that
DBS may change the patient’s identity. We call this
empirical assumption the “Change-of-Identity Thesis”
(CIT). The CIT figures prominently in the current
debate on the ethical implications of DBS (cf. e.g. [4,
20–22]). It commonly goes along with the second,
normative premise, that changing the patient’s identity
is ethically problematic and thus has to be weighed
against the benefits of DBS. Although the second
premise has to be sharpened in several respects ([21,
23]) these two theses form the basis for much of the
ethical concerns surrounding DBS.
This may explain why currently there is a
proliferation of interdisciplinary research projects
dealing with problems of personal identity in DBS.
This research faces not only empirical and ethical
challenges, but also a conceptual one: In order to
decide whether a change in mood, cognitive function,
behavioral or affective aspects is a change in personal
identity, we first have to clarify the concept of
“personal identity”. The empirical challenge then is
to find out if in fact DBS causes changes in the
patient’s identity and how this can be measured.
Assessing if changes are ethically relevant, which
characteristics a change has to show in order to be
seen as meaningful, and how different changes are to
be weighed against each other becomes an ethical
question. Thus, when we try to measure or to evaluate
changes in the patient’s identity we already presup-
pose an answer to the conceptual challenge, i.e. we
already presuppose a sufficiently clear definition of
“the patient’s identity”. In other words a solution to
the conceptual challenge is indispensable for
approaching the first two challenges. Its importance
is increased by the fact that most research projects in
this area involve participants from different disci-
plines. In such groups scientific progress depends to a
large degree on a clear, commonly accepted termi-
nology. Without answering the conceptual challenge
this common terminology is missing.
Notwithstanding its significance for dealing with
the empirical and the ethical challenge, the conceptual
challenge has been somewhat neglected in discussing
the consequences of DBS. Therefore, the primary aim
of our paper is to work towards a solution of the
conceptual challenge. This shall require an explication
of what we mean when judging that someone has
become “another person” or that DBS “alters the
patient’s identity”. Our second aim is to reflect on the
possibility of empirically measuring alterations in a
patient’s identity with the instruments now commonly
used and possibly identify others that may be more
helpful in selecting and monitoring patient progress
following the procedure. If identity changes matter
ethically, it should be in our interest to learn more
about them.
A Puzzling Case
We will begin our discussion with a few quotes from
a case reported by Schüpbach et al. [13]. It will give
us an impression of what proponents of the CIT
presumably have in mind when ascertaining “alter-
ations in the patient’s identity”. The case describes a
38-year old female journalist, married with one child,
who had PD (caused by a mutation in the parkin
gene) for 30 years. The authors explain
“[b]efore stimulation, in spite of her motor
handicap, she was dynamic: «Combating the
disease gave meaning to my life. I hope that
stimulation will allow me to get on with my life
and my projects.» Six months after the opera-
tion, the patient was not satisfied in spite of a
75% improvement of her motor handicap …
After 18 months of stimulation, she was no
longer able to work, had a loss of inspiration
and a taste for her work and for life in general.
«Now I feel like a machine, I’ve lost my
passion. I don’t recognize myself anymore.»
Her family no longer interested her, she was
easily exhausted, and had a loss of vitality …,
which led her to interrupt all professional
activity.” ([13], 1812, our emphasis)
The female journalist has significant worries
concerning her identity following the operation.1
These worries were not epistemically grounded.
When complaining “I don’t recognize myself any-
more”, she does not appear to be saying that her
memory or other cognitive faculties have been
impaired. ‘Her sight wasn’t blinded’, one could say.
1 Similar worries were experienced by many of the other
patients included in Schüpbach’s study. Feelings of “unfamil-
iarity with themselves after surgery” (ibd: 1813) were reported
by 19 out of 29 patients (ibd.).
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It seems that she doesn’t recognize herself because in
some important sense she is not herself anymore.
Still, such a statement is puzzling. When judging “I
am not myself anymore”, the woman seems to be
saying that she is and, at the same time, is not the
same individual as before the operation. But this
would be an overt contradiction. No single thing can
at the same time be itself and not be itself. How can
we avoid this impasse?
A possible way out is to acknowledge “the
multifarious nature of personal identity” ([24], 3):
that there is not a single, monolithic question of
personal identity but several interrelated questions.
One way to examine this issue is to take up Marya
Schechtman’s influential distinction between the
“characterization question” and the “reidentification
question” of personal identity (ibd. 1).2 The charac-
terization question asks about personal identity in the
“Who am I?” sense. It refers to what is at issue in
identity crises and is somehow closely linked to our
deepest values and beliefs which “make someone the
person she is” (2). It thus involves certain elements or
states figuring prominently in a person’s mental life.
Following Olson ([36], 356) we will call the kind of
identity asked for in the characterization question
“individual identity”. Some writers use the term
“personality” instead of “individual identity” when
answering the characterization question (e.g. [4, 37]).
We prefer to keep these notions apart, using “person-
ality” as a psychological concept and “individual
identity” as a philosophical concept.
The reidentification question asks for numerical
identity. More formally, it asks if “a person who exists
at one time is identical with something that exists at
another time (whether or not it is a person then)”
([36], 357). “Numerical identity” denotes the logical
relation of identity. It concerns identity in a deep
metaphysical sense.
It is impossible for anything to change its
numerical identity. Thus, while the female journalist’s
individual identity seems to have changed, her
numerical identity must have been unaffected by
DBS if the above description is to make sense. In
other words, while she may have changed her
individual identity, in a deep metaphysical sense she
must have remained one and the same human being.
In our essay we are exclusively concerned with
individual identity. Questions relating to numerical
identity will stay out of focus.
Individual Identity
Two Broad Views
What does it take to remain the same person? In
answering this question, some people are quite
radical. Simon Blackburn remarks that Proust’s
pervasive melancholy can partly be attributed to his
belief that we constantly change. This is due to his
conviction
“that the self that achieves a desire is never the
same as the self that had the desire.” ([30], 259,
n.35)
But such an extreme view is not only apt to induce
melancholy; it is plainly wrong. If Proust were correct
we all would change our identities several times a
day: before and after breakfast or every time we
quench our thirst or scratch our heads. But, clearly,
this conflicts with our intuitions about what it means
to remain the same person. If Proust really believed
this, his reasoning must have somewhere gone awry.
A similarly broad concept of “identity” has
recently been put forward by Synofzik and Schläpfer
[23]. The authors begin their discussion of what they
interchangeably call “personality” or “self” with the
statement that apparently,
“the question whether DBS … might alter
personality or not seems to be one of the
fundamental ethical questions.” ([23], 2)3
This sounds as if Synofzik and Schläpfer side with us
in analyzing the validity of objections against DBS
resting upon CIT, seemingly using the terms “persona
2 A similar distinction is made by many philosophers working
on personal identity; cf. e.g. [25–27] and [28]. Not all
philosophers agree that this move is correct; cf. [29–34]; the
same is implicit in [35], 204–209, 298–302.
3 Synofzik and Schläpfer officially restrict their discussion to
psychiatric indications. An important reason for this restriction
seems to be their goal to emphasize the absurdity of the claim
that every change in what they call “personality” is bad. This is
an important point for evaluating the ethical controversy
surrounding the CIT. We see no reason why their conception
of “personality” should apply only to psychiatric patients. In
fact, the authors themselves refer to ‘personality’-relevant
consequences of DBS for movement disorders; cf. [23], 4.
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lity” and “self” as equivalent to what we call “individual
identity”. But surprisingly they hold that:
“[t]o gain normative orientation, the concept of
«personality» is not useful—even if a naturalis-
tic notion is employed.” (1)
How do they justify this antinormative claim? The
answer to this question will prove important for our
own thoughts. It is therefore best developed in stages.
Synofzik and Schläpfer begin their discussion of
the topic by pointing out the prima facie importance
of defining what is meant by “personality/self” in
order to “delineate normative questions from the fact
whether DBS «changes personality or not»” (2). They
then go on to dismiss the notion of a “non-physical
self” which they deem unhelpful and “highly implau-
sible” and which in their view should be replaced by
some “naturalistic account of the self” (3). The next
step is to explicate their own account of “personality”
which is the crucial step in their argument. In their
view “personality” denotes “a supramodal represen-
tational system with largely heterogeneous functional
and (self-)representational levels” (4). This supra-
modal system includes “low-level sensory, motor or
vegetative states” as well as “highly elaborated mental
phenomena such as the experience of agency” (ibd.).
In other words, what they propose is a conception of
“personality” that embraces practically all biological
and mental phenomena occurring in a human being.
With such a notion in mind, the above-mentioned,
antinormative conclusion easily follows: If the alter-
ation of even “low-level sensory, motor or vegetative
states” entails an alteration of our personality, it is
evident that this concept (alone) cannot serve as a
moral compass.
Synofzik and Schläpfer’s understanding of “the self”
(3) is doubtful for reasons having to do with our
refutation of Blackburn’s presentation of the Proustian
view. It also becomes clear that the supposed equiva-
lence between “personality/self” and “individual iden
tity” no longer holds because according to Synofzik und
Schläpfer, “personality” is an inherently transient
phenomenon.4 “Personality” as explicated by the
supramodal-system approach is therefore not suited to
serve our purpose of characterizing a person. An
adequate conception of “individual identity” has to
shed light on the CIT and to serve as a conceptual
background for the controversy surrounding much of
the ethical discussion about DBS. The CIT is
concerned with questions of remaining or not remain-
ing the same person—questions which the supramodal-
system model cannot answer. Therefore, whatever
merits this approach may have in other regards, it is
unhelpful for discussing questions concerning cases
like the one of the female journalist in a meaningful
and differentiating way. In order to make progress on
this point we have to go beyond this and other
similarly broad notions of personal identity.5
Core-Periphery Models
If not every change in a person’s psyche counts as a
change in identity, then which changes do? It is quite
common in philosophy to think about a person’s
individual identity in terms of a core-periphery model,
the core-periphery distinction being introduced to
indicate that not all psychic elements are of equal
importance to the person ([31], 99–100; [32], 153–
154; [33, 34], 27–28). To say that psychic element E
is ‘located’ closer to the core than another element F
means that E is more important for and more
distinctive of the person than F:
“[The] core attitudes … determine what [a
person’s] life is all about and what is important
to her; they give shape and contour to her way
of looking at, and being in, the world. In a very
significant sense, they make her who she is.”
([31], 100)
All changes and only changes in central attitudes
constitute a change in individual identity, i.e. if and
only if our central beliefs, values, ideals, plans,
projects, ideologies etc. change, we change in a
substantial way. That much is granted by many
4 Perhaps Synofzik and Schläpfer do not intend their account of
“personality” to answer the characterization question (there is
some reason to believe this; cf. the following note)—but then
their antinormative claim reduces to a mere terminological
point.
5 It should be added that at the end of their presentation
Synofzik and Schläpfer suggest how mental elements crucial
for individual identity might be characterized: “[T]he ethically
important question is not whether DBS alters personality or not,
but whether it does so in «a good or bad way» from the
patient’s very own perspective.” (4) This comes close to what
we call the “activity model of individual identity”. This model
will be discussed in the next section.
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philosophers working in the field.6 There is, however,
some disagreement over the question what it means to
say that certain attitudes are “central” or “belong to
the core”. This question will be addressed in the next
two subsections.
The Activity Model
According to a widely influential account, a given
attitude’s being central to a person’s identity neces-
sarily involves that person’s reflective endorsement.7
The person has to somehow support or identify with
an attitude (a belief or a desire) of hers in order that it
may be central to who she is. As an example, consider
Sheila, a young woman living in New York City.
Sheila cares a lot about her grandmother which is why
she regularly visits her in the nearby nursing home.
Usually she doesn’t deliberate over these visits but
today she feels an intense reluctance to go and see the
old lady. Being surprised by her dislike, Sheila asks
herself if she really wants to keep on with her habit.
On reflection, however, she endorses her visiting
desire and rejects the other: she wants her visiting
desire to be effective in action. Her desire to meet her
grandmother is thus part of Sheila’s individual
identity whereas the desire to abandon the visit is not.
Does her endorsement establish the visiting
desire’s being central to Sheila’s identity? Not
necessarily. Sheila may have many other desires, each
of which she would endorse on reflection and some of
which may conflict due to changing circumstances.
Let’s assume that her desire to get on with her career
is one such desire. One day, she receives an
interesting job offer from the west coast. To accept
it would involve seeing her beloved grandma only a
few times a year. This troubles Sheila and after some
deliberation she decides to stay in New York City.
From this, one can deduce that Sheila’s visiting desire
is more important to her than her desire to get ahead
with her job. It seems that only if this result is (or
would be) repeated in most cases of conflict between
the visiting desire and other desires belonging to
Sheila’s individual identity that it can truly be said
that the former desire is central to her identity.8
The notion of “centrality to identity” seems to
involve acts of rejection, endorsement and ordering of
attitudes. But what role do these acts play exactly?
The well-known philosopher Harry G. Frankfurt
writes:
“It is these acts of ordering and rejection—
integration and separation—that create a self out
of the raw materials of inner life.” ([33], 170)
This sounds as if without these acts of ordering and
endorsement (or rejection) the inner life of the person
is nothing but a disordered jumble of raw materials
waiting for the person to impose upon them a neat
core-periphery structure. Call this the “activity model”
of individual identity.9 As Sheila’s example shows, this
model seems fit to explain what “centrality to identity”
is supposed to mean.
However, the activity model of individual identity
shows an explanatory gap in leaving open the
question of who is supposed to carry out the ‘acts of
ordering and endorsement’ mentioned above. One
might regret that “creating an orderly arrangement”
([33], 173) among the objects in a room as well as
within oneself is an activity which presupposes an
agent. But cleaning up does not simply happen—it
requires someone who does it.
One way to complete Frankfurt’s picture is to think
of the agent as somehow distinct from the rest of the
raw materials of inner life. In whatever state of
disorder those may find themselves, the agent “as
distinct from relevant psychological events, processes
and states” ([42], 39) enters the scene and puts them
in order. This is an interpretation that we would like
6 Cf. e.g. [27], 320. Perhaps this claim is too bold and we
should include emotions into our analysis of individual identity;
cf. [34]. This, however, is a task for another day.
7 Cf. e.g. [38], 603–610; [39], 18; [33], 170–172. Probably we
can also add Synofzik and Schläpfer, [23], to this list; cf.n. 5.
8 Probably, hypothetical endorsement would suffice here. In
what follows, we will not discuss this issue further for the sake
of simplicity.
9 As Frankfurt is mostly concerned about questions of
authenticity and autonomy, we might also interpret his remarks
as indicating that the above mentioned acts create something
which may be called “our own identity” and which may be
contrasted with, e.g., an “alienated identity”. In this case
Frankfurt would probably escape our criticism. But even if we
take him literally here we should add that in later publications
Frankfurt himself casts doubt on the activity model and tries to
formulate a model of individual identity involving so-called
“volitional necessities” which comes close to our own proposal;
cf. e.g. [40] and [41]. However it is a matter of controversy how
successful he has been in this respect; cf. 48, 93–94.
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to avoid.10 When writing that “someone” is required
to do the ordering and rejecting, we don’t want to
introduce into our model a mystical agent “floating
around or somehow attached to the human being”
([32], 153).
Instead we take another route to close the explana-
tory gap left open by the activity model of individual
identity. In this we follow the lead of such diverse
authors as Sigmund Freud, Simon Blackburn, Michael
E. Bratman and many others who think that the vantage
point from which the acts of endorsement and ordering
can be carried out is constituted by other desires. These,
of course, are not just any desires. Instead,
“[t]hose desires have to do with the conception I
have of the life I want and the sort of person I
want to be.” ([25], 130)
If this is right, the activity model is unpersuasive.
Remember that according to that model the self is
created through certain acts out of the raw materials
of inner life. Before these acts have taken place, there
are desires and beliefs but there is also a lack of
structure. Certainly, a structureless set of attitudes
cannot account for such a cognitively and volitionally
sophisticated phenomenon as a conception of the life
a person wants to lead and the sort of person she
wants to be. Without something like a more or less
elaborated core-periphery structure of desires and
beliefs already in place, she lacks the vantage point
from which to carry out the acts of ordering and
endorsement. In an important aspect the picture upon
which the activity model is based is therefore
inappropriate. Our selves do not arise like a phoenix
from the ashes.
These considerations are not without consequences
for the general thrust of activity-based models of
centrality to individual identity. We have just argued
that the acts of endorsement, ordering and rejection
presuppose an already structured inner life. But this
means that these acts just cannot be a necessary
constituent of centrality to identity. The present
account has taken us full circle: according to it, a
desire is central to a person’s identity only if it is
endorsed by a desire which is central to that person’s
identity. It is obvious that such an account doesn’t
give us any additional information except for the
well-established fact that some desires (and beliefs)
are more important than others for a given person.11
The Foundational-Function Model
The previous discussion has shown that acts of
rejection, endorsement and ordering are not necessary
for a mental element to belong to the core of a
person’s identity. Centrality to identity, it seems, does
not depend on any activity on behalf of the subject. It
may (totally or in part) be established by certain acts
of the subject herself but it might as well (totally or in
part) be shaped by education, socialization and all
kinds of manipulation (cf. [31], 99–105)—or, as it is
assumed in the Change-of-Identity Thesis (CIT), by
DBS. In the latter cases the subject is (more or less)
passive; (to some degree or other) she ‘receives’ her
identity, including an appropriately structured set of
core attitudes.
On the face of it, this may sound repugnant: how
can anything as meaningful as the difference between
the attitudes belonging to the core and those belong-
ing to the periphery of our identity be the product of
external intervention? Surely, what distinguishes that
in which we believe most deeply and which we most
care about from the rest of our attitudes must be—
somehow—grounded in us, i.e. it must be—at least
partly—the product of our own doing. From this kind
of reasoning it is seems to be just a short step to the
activity model. How can we avoid relapsing? Two
considerations might prove helpful. First, our every-
day experience suggests practicing some humility. We
cannot control everything in our lives. A lot of things
that are crucial for who we are and what we do are
simply given to us (including our biological make-
11 If this argument is correct it is an objection not only to
Frankfurt’s model but to any conception of individual identity
which presupposes activity on behalf of the subject. This
especially concerns some so-called “narrative theories of
individual identity” holding that a person creates his identity
by forming an autobiographical narrative. These theories are
currently very popular in the bioethics literature, cf. [21, 28, 44]
and [19]. One way for narrativists to avoid our critique may be
to emphasize the social nature of individual identity figuring
prominently in their accounts, cf. [24, 45, 46]. They could try to
argue that a person’s individual identity preceding the identity
created by her first autobiographical narrative is somehow
constituted by a biographical story, suitably told by others. It is
beyond doubt that these points deserve much more discussion
than we can give them here.
10 For criticism of such ‘homuncular’ conceptions of the agent
or the ‘self’, cf. e.g. [43], 23; [25], 124–126; [42], 38–39; [32],
152–153.
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up). We discover ourselves at least as much as we
create ourselves. Second, in the foregoing paragraph
we qualified our assertions by adding in parentheses
that activity and passivity concerning the structure of
individual identity may both play their part. In fact,
this is probably the case in most adults. In most of us
at least some of our core attitudes have earned their
place through acts of endorsement and ordering. The
point we would like to emphasize is that it just
doesn’t have to be this way—or else the whole picture
is threatened by incoherence.
Now, if acts of ordering and endorsement cannot
ground centrality to identity, what else can? In our
view “centrality to identity” should be analyzed in
terms of certain relational properties of the relevant
attitudes, regardless of their origin. A relational
property that is prominent in some accounts of the
core of individual identity is the coherence between
mental elements:
“[W]e take an agent’s true or most central self
to be a subset of these acceptances and
preferences, namely, those that cohere together.”
([38], 608)12
What make the elements of a given set cohere is that
they “fit together” (ibd.).13 Undoubtedly, coherence is
important for the idea of “individual identity” but it
should not be overvalued especially since this relation
can hold between central as well as between central
and peripheral attitudes. Remember Sheila. One of the
things she most cares about is the well-being of her
grandma. This central desire may well ‘fit together’
with her desire to buy a bunch of roses for the old lady.
But to deduce from this that the latter desire is also
central to Sheila’s identity seems plainly wrong. The
desire may, for example, be perfectly ephemeral;
perhaps it occurred just because only today she took
a different route to the nursing home passing a flower
shop. Coherence thus cannot (fully) explain how it is
that some elements in a person’s psyche are closer to
the core than others.14
A relational property which is better suited for our
purposes is the foundational function of core attitudes
(cf. [27], 320). What do we mean by “foundational
function”? Consider an analogy from architecture. In
a building we can distinguish load-bearing walls from
those walls that have no support function. The latter
can be removed and rebuilt at will without endange
ring the stability of the building. This is not true for
load-bearing walls. To remove them causes the
building to cave in. Its support function is not only
a good way to find out if a given wall is a load-
bearing one or not; by definition load-bearing walls
carry the weight of the building. The same goes for
core attitudes.15 They serve as the foundation for
many or most of our other attitudes. Noggle writes:
“A person’s core beliefs and commitments are
the foundation for the rest of her cognitive
structure, the lens through which she sees the
rest of the world. (…) A change in them
constitutes a profound paradigm shift—a con-
version of sorts—that produces a radical cogni-
tive discontinuity between the pre- and post-
change selves. (…) A similar picture can be
drawn for human motivation.” ([27], 319)
If a person’s core attitudes change, she changes.
This model of individual identity draws on the
assumption that our beliefs and desires (broadly
understood) are not all on a par. Most of them are
connected via dependency relations such that the
validity of a more ‘subordinate’ attitude depends on
the validity of a ‘superior’ one but not vice versa.
These structures can be characterized as hierarchies of
desire and of belief. In the realm of desires, these
hierarchies may be expressed by way of the distinc-
tion between ‘instrumental’ and ‘intrinsic’ desires that
goes back at least to Aristotle (cf. [49], 113–114). In
the realm of beliefs such structures are less obvious,
but they are still in place (cf. [25], 154–163). Changes
in certain beliefs entail changes in countless other
beliefs while changes in others do not have many
further consequences. Just compare someone who had
the passing thought that it is windy outside and now
comes to believe that it isn’t, with someone who used
to firmly believe in god and now finds out (for
12 Cf. also [25], 123; [41], 139; [33], 172–174.
13 In most cases, conflicts between mental elements that are due
to changing circumstances do not threaten coherence. For
similar considerations concerning “wholeheartedness”, cf. [47],
103.
14 It may, however, be a necessary condition for centrality to
identity in that only cohering attitudes can be a part of the
person’s identity. This is disputed, cf. [48].
15 Glover attributes the load-bearing function only to second-
order beliefs, which he calls “structural beliefs”; cf. [25], 156.
We are more permissive at this point.
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himself) that there is no god out there. Our most
important beliefs can plausibly be regarded as (nearly)
fixed points in our belief-system; the other beliefs
being (regularly) adjusted to them or given up (cf.
[25], 155–156).16
If we interpret “centrality to identity” in terms of
“foundational function”, it becomes clear why a
change in her central attitudes changes the person. A
change in one of her core attitudes resounds through
the chain(s) of more peripheral attitudes that depend
on them. It entails what Noggle calls “a profound
paradigm shift” in her cognitive or practical stance to
the world.17 The reverse is not true. As her core
attitudes do not depend on her peripheral attitudes, the
latter can be given up without this having any direct
consequences for the person she is. Return once more
to Sheila. Assume she has just learned that her
grandmother doesn’t like flowers. To give up her
prior desire to buy a bunch of roses does not change
her in any interesting sense. On the contrary, it is by
quitting her desire to buy flowers that she readjusts
her ‘volitional periphery’ to her central desire to care
for the well-being of her grandmother, thus under-
lining the importance of the latter desire.
In our view this approach helps to explain what we
mean when we say that some attitudes “belong to the
core” or “are central to the identity of” a given person.
Unlike accounts that rely on acts of rejection,
endorsement and ordering, it does not presuppose
what it intends to explain. Unlike broad views or
accounts of centrality operating solely with a
coherence-criterion, it can differentiate between cen-
tral and peripheral attitudes. Thus, if we want to be
able to evaluate the CIT or to understand complaints
like the one of the female journalist, we should look
to a notion of “centrality to identity” which takes into
account the foundational function of attitudes.
The Measurability Question
Having outlined the conceptual framework we want
to finish our investigation of the conceptual
challenge with some observations on the measur-
ability of individual identity in the DBS context.
The question is whether changes in individual
identity as conceptualized above can be ascertained
by the tests now commonly used in selecting and
monitoring DBS patients. With this in mind we
now turn from philosophy to more empirical
matters.
In empirical research the concept coming closest to
what we have been examining throughout this paper
is the notion of “personality” as used in psychology
and psychiatry. Due to a definition widely acknow
ledged in the respective disciplines, “personality”
refers to
“the organized set of characteristics possessed by
a person that uniquely influences his or her
cognitions, motivations, and behaviors in various
situations.” ([52], 5)
This set of characteristics is commonly regarded
as remaining fairly stable at least in the medium
term (cf. [53], 5).
So far, tests of neuropsychological as well as
neuropsychiatric alterations in the large controlled
trials of DBS mentioned at the beginning of this
article were clinically driven, lacking a full-blown
background conception of “personality”. Additio
nally a review of 30 studies examining cognitive
effects of DBS in PD revealed that only 2 of them
had the statistical power to detect large effects,
whereas none of them could detect small or
medium effects [54]. This may explain why reliable
data of changes in personality have so far been
sparse and why the applied test instruments may not
adequately answer the question of whether or not
these changes in fact occur. In order to make
progress on this question, it might be expedient to
have a closer look on what psychology and
psychiatry have to offer to DBS/PD-research.
In psychiatry there are two general approaches
that can in principle be used to ascertain changes
in personality: the categorical and the dimensional
approach. In what follows we will briefly introduce
and evaluate them.
16 Dependency relations can also exist between attitudes of a
different order. We form higher-order attitudes when we reflect
upon and then endorse or reject certain first-order attitudes.
Noggle writes that higher-order desires “are best seen as getting
their content from core desires” ([27], 320). This would, by the
way, explain why higher-order desires are commonly regarded
as being more authentic—thus connecting the present essay
with the current preoccupation with ‘authenticity’ in some parts
of ethics and bioethics, cf. [50, 51].
17 If coherence is a necessary condition for centrality to identity
(cf. n.14) the effects of a change in a core attitude may even be
more sweeping because in order to reestablish coherence the
remaining core attitudes may to be adjusted to the change.
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The categorical approach is prominent in the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disor-
ders (DSM-IV-TR). Its aim is to distinguish between
normal and pathological forms of personality. The
DSM-IV-TR lists ten personality disorders defined by
approximately 7–9 items each, of which a subset must
be present in order to meet the diagnostic threshold.
In addition, the DSM-IV-TR includes a hierarchical
system of three clusters of personality disorders,
based on similarities in their characteristics: (1) odd/
eccentric, (2) dramatic/emotional/erratic, and (3)
anxious/fearful. This categorical, hierarchical taxo-
nomic system offers several pragmatic advantages: it
maps out neatly the decision of whether to provide
treatment, and it is relatively easy to use for purposes
of communication and conceptualization. Much
information can be conveyed using a single diagnostic
label regarding features, associated conditions, and
possible treatment options.
In DBS/PD-research test instruments based on the
categorical approach such as the Structured Clinical
Interview for DSM disorders (SCID-II) have occa-
sionally been used [55]. However, we doubt that these
instruments are adequate for our purpose: It is
conceivable that the implantation and subsequent
stimulation of neural tissues may cause some patho-
logical changes in personality. With regard to the
diagnostic criteria these would be best characterized
as an “Organic Personality Disorder” (ICD-10:
F07.0)18 or a “Personality Change Due to a General
Medical Condition” (DSM-IV-TR). However, we are
not aware of any evidence that changes following
DBS are pronounced enough to cause a full-blown
personality disorder in a significant number of cases.
Of course, it cannot be ruled out a priori that DBS
can have such severe consequences, but it seems at
least highly improbable to us as far as evidence from
studies, case reports and our own experience is
concerned that this regularly is the case.
We rather presume that the changes mentioned will
normally take place on a subclinical level.19 If this is
correct, tests based on the categorical approach to
personality will (regularly) turn out to be too coarse-
grained to register the kind of changes we are
interested in—changes like the one experienced by
Schüpbach’s female journalist. What we need are
instruments that are more sensitive than the categor-
ical approach taken by the DSM-IV-TR. Perhaps the
dimensional approach to “personality” can afford a
sensible starting point to answer the measurability
question.
The dimensional approach to “personality” is
mainly associated with the Trait Theory that emerged
toward the end of the 1980s. The Trait Theory is
focused on identifying and measuring individual
personality characteristics [56] along five dimensions.
This five-factor model of personality represents five
core traits or dimensions that form human personality
([57, 58]). While researchers often disagree about the
exact labels for each dimension, the following are
described most commonly: Extraversion, Agreeable-
ness, Conscientiousness, Neuroticism and Openness.
But which of the dimensional tests may be useful for
our purposes?
The Dimensional Assessment of Personality
Pathology—Basic Questionnaire (DAPP-BQ) [59]
and the Temperament and Character Inventory (TCI)
[60] are two empirically well established tests based
on the dimensional approach. They were designed to
assess personality disorders along the full continu-
um—from mild to extreme trait manifestations [61].
Their focus on personality disorder may render
them, however, inappropriate to detect the subtle
changes we are concerned about. Instruments such
as the Revised NEO Personality Inventory (NEO-
PI-R) [62] or the NEO-Five Factor Inventory (NEO-
FFI) may be more useful in the longitudinal
exploration of changes in personality dimensions
of patients with DBS.
The NEO-PI-R and the NEO-FFI may indeed be
fine-grained enough to ascertain changes in perso
nality due to DBS. However, it is an open question if
these tests are able to register the changes we have
been concerned about throughout this paper—
changes in individual identity. On the face of it, the
concepts of “individual identity”, understood accor
ding to the foundational function model and “perso
nality” in terms of the Trait Theory are not equivalent,
because the Trait Theory of personality does not
include information about the relation between central
18 “ICD-10” is the abbreviation for “International Statistical
Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems”. It is
published by the World Health Organization.
19 Since an Organic Personality Disorder is often accompanied
by enduring emotional instability and reduced impulse control,
we may pay more attention on symptoms which are associated
typically with personality disorders within the second cluster
(see above).
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and peripheral attitudes.20 We hence presume that
currently available and usually applied scales to detect
personality changes in patients with DBS are not suitable
to reliably ascertain the kinds of changes in personal
identity that from an ethical point of view might turn out
to be the most relevant and troubling in DBS.
Therefore we propose a design for longitudinal
studies combining a philosophical investigation of the
concept of “personal identity”, semi-structured inter-
views of patients and their caregivers, and validated
quantitative test instruments. We expect such a design
to clarify the aspects and severity of identity changes
that are ethically relevant for patients, caregivers and
clinical staff in the context of DBS. Changes not
detectable with standard instruments might be identi-
fied in the interview. This especially concerns the
difficult question of centrality of certain beliefs,
projects, etc. for the patient. The inclusion of care-
givers might help to supplement the patient’s own
perspective with the information gathered in the
interview with the caregiver. This may supply a
potentially fruitful second account of how DBS has
affected the patient’s identity.21
Conclusion and Future Perspectives
Cases like Schüpbach’s female journalist have given
rise to a series of concerns about and even objections
against DBS all of which feature the patient’s identity.
A common presupposition prominent in most of these
objections is the “Change-of-Identity Thesis” (CIT).
In order to better understand what is at stake in the
CIT we tried to illuminate what a “change in a
person’s identity” means by discussing several possi-
ble models of “individual identity” including two
broad views, the activity model and a model
emphasizing the role of coherence. We finally opted
for the “foundational-function model” that in our
view has the best prospects to serve as a model for the
changes in a patient’s identity we are most concerned
about in PD/DBS-research. We thus propose our
approach as a suitable starting point for a differen
tiated ethical evaluation of DBS.
Of course, our work isn’t finished yet. It remains
unclear if ‘foundational function’ can only be attributed
to attitudes that do not depend on any other attitudes or if
attitudes “crystallizing pressures from various elements
of one’s psychic stew” ([42], 51) can also exert this
function. Furthermore the role of coherence in indivi
dual identity has to be made more precise. We
suggested that it might be a necessary feature of
elements constituting individual identity but also
pointed out that this is not devoid of controversy (see
above, n. 14). Lastly, the foundational-function model
itself has to be made more precise; we need to
formulate some criterion, some necessary and/or suffi-
cient conditions for an attitude to be a core attitude.
If changes in personality matter ethically we should
strive to reliably identify them. Our proposed answers to
the “measurability question” offer some possibilities for
future empirical research that may capture salient aspects
of personality change following DBS. It appears that the
dimensional approach will be the onemost likely to yield
valuable results. However, this empirical endeavor
should be accompanied by some in-depth thoughts
on the relation between “personality” and “individ-
ual identity”. Since there are at least prima facie
differences between the two concepts, it is question-
able if tests geared to the former can yield useful
results about the latter. This underlines the impor-
tance of supplementing quantitative test instruments
with data from semi-structured qualitative interviews
of patients and caregivers focusing on individual
identity and the possibility of developing further
instruments that will bring us closer to understanding
these important phenomena.
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